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When Life Means Life: Juries, Parole, and Capital
Sentencing
A criminal defendant has been convicted of capital murder; now
begins the sentencing phase when a jury will decide whether the
defendant is to be executed or confined to prison for life. As part of
her case for the death penalty, the prosecutor argues that the
defendant will pose a continuing threat to the community if spared.'
The jury must impose the death penalty, she explains, as an act of
"self-defense" against a murderer who is "in our midst."' The trial
judge, the prosecutor, the defendant, and the defendant's counsel all
know that a life sentence for this defendant will not include the
possibility of parole The jury, however, will be instructed only that
its choice is between execution and life imprisonment.4 If the jurors
ask about the possibility of parole, the judge will simply tell them that
parole is not a proper consideration, and that the terms "life
imprisonment" and "death sentence" should be understood within
their plain meaning.5 Does a death sentence rendered under these
circumstances violate the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution?
In Simmons v. South Carolina,6 the United States Supreme Court
found that under these circumstances a death sentence does violate
the defendant's constitutional rights.7 The Court held that when a
sentencing jury in a capital case must choose between imposing life
imprisonment or a death sentence, and state law eliminates any
possibility of the defendant's being released on parole, and the
defendant's future dangerousness is at issue, the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that the sentencing jury be
informed that the defendant would not be eligible for parole if given
a life sentence.'
1. See Simmons v. South Carolina, 114 S. Ct. 2187,2190-91 (1994) (plurality opinion).
2. Id. (plurality opinion).
3. See id. at 2191 (plurality opinion).
4. See id. at 2192 (plurality opinion).
5. See id.
6. 114 S. Ct. 2187 (1994) (plurality opinion).
7. Id. at 2190 (plurality opinion).
8. Id. The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides in
part: "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life,
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This Note first summarizes the facts of the Simmons case, its
treatment by the South Carolina courts, and the opinions of the
Supreme Court Justices.9 It next considers the development of the
Court's review of state capital sentencing procedures under the Eighth
Amendment and the Due Process Clause.1" The Note then examines
the place and impact of the Simmons decision in the context of these
established constitutional principles. Finally, the Note concludes
that the Simmons Court opened the door to a new class of appellants
from capital convictions and suggests a direction that the Court may
take in subsequent cases.'
In July 1990, Jonathon Simmons entered Josie Lamb's home in
Columbia, South Carolina. 3 After making sure that she was alone,
he pursued the seventy-nine-year-old woman 4 into her bathroom
and beat her to death.'" Afterward, he took one of her nightgowns
and left the house.'6 Following his arrest for Ms. Lamb's murder,
Simmons confessed to sexually and physically assaulting elderly
women on three prior occasions.'7 As a result, under South Carolina
law, Simmons would be ineligible for parole if convicted of a
subsequent "violent" crime.'8
Prior to jury selection, the trial judge granted the State's motion
to prohibit the defense from mentioning the subject of parole or
asking prospective jurors whether they understood what "life
imprisonment" meant under South Carolina law. 9 Subsequently, the
jury convicted Simmons of Ms. Lamb's murder.20 In its closing
liberty, or property, without due process of law.. . ." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
9. See infra notes 13-87 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 88-143 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 144-215 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 216-35 and accompanying text.
13. Simmons, 114 S. Ct. at 2190 (plurality opinion).
14. State v. Simmons, 427 S.E.2d 175, 176 (S.C. 1993), rev'd sub nom. Simmons v.
South Carolina, 114 S. Ct. 2187 (1994).
15. Simmons, 114 S. Ct. at 2190 (plurality opinion).
16. State v. Simmons, 427 S.E.2d at 176.
17. Id. at 177. The three prior incidents all occurred within the twelve months
preceding the murder of Ms. Lamb; one of the earlier victims was Simmons's own
grandmother. Id.
18. Simmons, 114 S. Ct. at 2190 (plurality opinion); see S.C. CODE ANN. § 24-21-640
(Supp. 1991) ("The Board [of Probation, Parole and Pardon] must not grant parole nor
is parole authorized to any prisoner serving a sentence for second or subsequent
conviction, following a separate sentencing for a prior conviction, for violent crimes..
19. Simmons, 114 S. Ct. at 2190 (plurality opinion).
20. Id. (plurality opinion).
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argument at the sentencing phase,21 the State suggested that the jury
consider Simmons's future dangerousness in deciding his punish-
ment.' Specifically, the prosecution argued that the "question for
the jury ... was what to do with [petitioner] now that he is in our
midst,"'  and that a death sentence "would b 'a response of society
to someone who is a threat."' 4 "Your verdict," the jurors were told,
"will be an act of self-defense."5
Simmons's counsel requested that the jury be instructed that if it
imposed a life sentence, Simmons could not be released on parole.26
In support of this request, the defense presented the findings of a
statewide public opinion survey indicating that a large majority of
South Carolinians believed that an inmate sentenced to life imprison-
ment eventually would be released on parole.2 7 The judge refused
the requested instruction.'
After ninety minutes of deliberation, the jury sent a note to the
judge that posed a single question: "Does the imposition of a life
sentence carry with it the possibility of parole?, 29  The judge
informed the jury that the possibility of parole was not a proper
21. South Carolina employs a bifurcated proceeding for capital prosecutions, divided
between a guilt-determination phase and a penalty phase. See id. (plurality opinion). See
generally Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 195 (1976) (endorsing a capital sentencing
procedure that provides for separate guilt-determination and sentencing phases,
consideration of specified aggravating and mitigating factors, and expedited review of
death sentences by the state supreme court).
22. Simmons, 114 S. Ct. at 2190-91 (plurality opinion).
23. Id. at 2190 (plurality opinion) (second alteration in original) (citation and
quotation omitted).
24. Id. at 2190-91 (plurality opinion) (citation and quotation omitted).
25. Id. at 2191 (plurality opinion) (citation and quotation omitted).
26. Id. (plurality opinion).
27. Id. (plurality opinion). The survey was conducted by the University of South
Carolina's Institute for Public Affairs. Id (plurality opinion).
28. Id. at 2192 (plurality opinion). In State v. Torrence, the South Carolina Supreme
Court had decided that a capital sentencing jury should receive no instruction on parole
eligibility. 406 S.E.2d 315, 321 (S.C. 1991) (Chandler, J., concurring in the result). The
trial judge in Simmons also rejected an alternative instruction, proposed by the defense,
that the sentences" 'mean what they say,' "that the jury was "'not to speculate that the
sentences mean anything other than [life imprisonment or death],'" and that the sentence
imposed " 'is exactly what will happen to the defendant . ... ' " 114 S. Ct. at 2192
(plurality opinion). However, the judge indicated that he might give a similar instruction
should the jury inquire about parole eligibility. Id. Presumably the judge was referring
to the "plain meaning" instruction that was eventually given. See infra text accompanying
note 30. For background on the development of the South Carolina Supreme Court's
treatment of jury parole instructions, see generally James M. Hughes, Note, Informing
South Carolina Capital Juries About Parole, 44 S.C. L. REv. 383 (1993) (criticizing the
Torrence decision in light of prior South Carolina Supreme Court decisions).
29. Simmons, 114 S. Ct. at 2192 (plurality opinion) (citation and quotation omitted).
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consideration, and that " '[t]he terms life imprisonment and death
sentence are to be understood in their plan [sic] and ordinary
meaning.' ,3' Twenty-five minutes later, the jury sentenced Simmons
to death.3'
On appeal in the South Carolina Supreme Court, the defendant
argued that the trial court's failure to instruct the jury on Simmons's
ineligibility for parole violated his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment
rights.32 Affirming the death sentence,33 the court held that, al-
though the trial judge erred in failing to give the alternative charge
requested by the defense prior to deliberations,' the "plain
meaning" charge given by the trial judge in response to the jury's
question substantially satisfied the defense's request.35
The United States Supreme Court reversed Simmons's death
sentence. 6 Justice Blackmun, writing for a plurality of the Court,37
stated that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
prohibits the execution of a defendant "on the basis of information
which he had no opportunity to deny or explain."38 The plurality
acknowledged that future dangerousness is an appropriate con-
sideration in capital sentencing,39 but noted that the actual time a
defendant would be incarcerated is "indisputably relevant" to
assessing the future threaft40 That relevance was made particularly
evident in the Simmons case when the judge refused to inform the
jury about the possibility of parole.41 The plurality stated that "[t]he
trial court's failure to apprise the jury of information so crucial to its
30. Id. (plurality opinion) (second alteration in original) (citation omitted).
31. ld. (plurality opinion).
32. Id. (plurality opinion).
33. Id. (plurality opinion).
34. See supra text accompanying note 26.
35. Simmons, 114 S. Ct. at 2192 (plurality opinion). In addition, the court noted that
the United States Supreme Court had indicated in California v. Ramos that whether to
instruct jurors on parole eligibility is a matter of state law. State v. Simmons, 427 S.E.2d
175,178 (S.C. 1993) (citing California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 1014 (1983)); see infra notes
139-43 and accompanying text.
36. Simmons, 114 S. Ct. at 2198 (plurality opinion).
37. Justice Blackmun was joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg. Id. at
2190 (plurality opinion).
38. Id. at 2192 (plurality opinion) (quoting Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 362
(1977)).
39. Id. at 2193 (plurality opinion) (citing California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 1003 n.17
(1983)); see Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 896-97 (1983); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262,
275 (1976).
40. Simmons, 114 S. Ct. at 2194 (plurality opinion).
41. Id. at 2195 (plurality opinion).
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sentencing determination ... cannot be reconciled with our well-
established precedents interpreting the Due Process Clause."'42
Justice Blackmun responded to arguments by the State and its
amici that an instruction on Simmons' eligibility for parole would be
"inherently misleading," by stating that such an explanation would be
an entirely accurate statement of Simmons's parole status.4 3 The
plurality found "little force" in the State's argument that such an
instruction might confuse juries into believing that an inmate serving
a life term without the possibility of parole could never be released
from prison.' According to Justice Blackmun, an accurate instruc-
tion on parole status is "[c]ertainly ... more accurate than no
instruction at all . . . ."' Justice Blackmun further noted that in a
"large majority" of states that provide for life without parole as an
alternative to a death sentence, that information is supplied to the
sentencing authority.46
Justice Blackmun then turned to the State's reliance on the
language of California v. Ramos.47 He acknowledged "that Ramos
stands for the broad proposition that [the Court] generally will defer
to a State's determination as to what a jury should and should not be
told about sentencing,"'  and that as a general rule states may
42. Id. at 2194 (plurality opinion). The Court expressly declined to consider whether
the Eighth Amendment would compel the same result. Id at 2193 n.4 (plurality opinion).
43. Id. at 2195 (plurality opinion).
44. Id. (plurality opinion). The State and its amici had argued that future legislative
action might change an inmate's parole status, as could an executive pardon. Id. at 2195
n.6 (plurality opinion). Justice Blackmun responded by noting that state regulations barred
furloughs and work-release for parole-ineligible inmates, that pardons were (under S.C.
Code Ann. § 24-21-950 D (1989)) to be given only in highly unusual circumstances, and
that invoking possible future action by the legislature was highly speculative. Id. at 2195
& n.6 (plurality opinion).
45. Id. at 2195 (plurality opinion).
46. Id. (plurality opinion). At the time Simmons was decided, 26 states both involved
the jury in capital sentencing and provided for life imprisonment without parole as an
alternative to the death penalty. Id. at 2195 n.7 (plurality opinion). Of these, nine
identified the sentencing alternatives as death and life without parole (Alabama, Arkansas,
California, Connecticut, Delaware, Louisiana, Missouri, New Hampshire, Washington);
eight allowed the jury to specify whether the defendant should or should not be eligible
for parole (Georgia, Indiana, Maryland, Nevada, Oklahoma, Oregon, Tennessee, Utah);
and three required that the jury be instructed that the defendant will be ineligible for
parole (when accurate) (Colorado, Illinois, Mississippi). Id. at 2195-96 n.7 (plurality
opinion). Three other states had not addressed the question at the time of the opinion
(Florida, South Dakota, Wyoming). Id. at 2196 n.7 (plurality opinion). Only two states
besides South Carolina had life without parole sentencing but did not inform the jury
(Pennsylvania and Virginia). Id. at 2197 n.8 (plurality opinion).
47. Id. at 2195-96 (plurality opinion); see supra note 35.
48. Id. at 2196 (plurality opinion).
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therefore properly decide to withhold from a jury all information
regarding parole.49 The plurality reasoned, however, that when the
State opens the issue by resting its case for the death penalty at least
partially on the issue of the defendant's future dangerousness, the fact
that the defendant will be ineligible for parole "necessarily under-
cut[s]" the State's argument." Because his ineligibility allows the
defendant to " 'deny or explain' " the prosecution's argument, due
process requires that the defendant be given an opportunity to place
such information before the jury 1
Contrary to the South Carolina court's conclusion, Justice
Blackmun found that the "plain meaning" instruction supplied by the
trial judge in response to the jury's question was not substantially the
same instruction as the defense had requested. He stated that "it
can hardly be questioned that most juries lack accurate information
about the precise meaning of 'life imprisonment' as defined by the
States."'53 In Justice Blackmun's view, informing the jury that it was
to understand the terms in their common meaning would do nothing
to allay the jury's misunderstandings. 4 While the trial court did
instruct the jury not to consider parole, "the instruction was confusing
and frustrating to the jury, given the arguments by both the
prosecution and the defense relating to... future dangerousness, and
the obvious relevance of ... parole ineligibility to the jury's for-
midable sentencing task."'55 The plurality noted that juries are
ordinarily presumed to follow instructions from the court,56 but in
some cases the risk that jurors will not follow instructions is too great,
49. Id. (plurality opinion); cf, e.g., id. at 2200-01 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the
judgment) ("[1If the prosecution does not argue future dangerousness, the State may
appropriately decide that parole is not a proper issue for the jury's consideration .... ");
id. at 2203-04 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("As a general matter, the Court leaves it to the States
to strike what they consider the appropriate balance among the ... factors [governing
admissibility of evidence]."); Blystone v. Pennsylvania, 494 U.S. 299, 309 (1990) ("Within
the constitutional limits defined by our cases, the States enjoy their traditional lattitude to
prescribe the method by which those who commit murder shall be punished."); Skipper
v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 11 (1986) (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment) ("[T]Iie
States ... retain 'the traditional authority' to determine what particular evidence ... is
relevant in the first instance." (citation omitted)).
50. Simmons, 114 S. Ct. at 2196 (plurality opinion).
51. Id. (plurality opinion) (quoting Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 362 (1977)).
52. ld. at 2196-97 (plurality opinion).
53. Id. at 2197 (plurality opinion); see infra note 63.
54. Simmons, 114 S. Ct. at 2197 (plurality opinion).
55. Id. (plurality opinion).
56. Id. (plurality opinion) (citing Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 766 n.8 (1987)).
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and the consequences too grave, to be ignored.' Furthermore,
Justice Blackmun noted, even if the instruction did prevent the jury
from considering the availability of parole, it would violate due
process because Simmons was entitled to use his parole ineligibility to
respond to the State's future dangerousness argument.58
Justice Souter, joined by Justice Stevens, wrote a concurring
opinion.59 He agreed with Justice Blackmun that the Due Process
Clause demanded that Simmons be able to inform the jury of his
parole ineligibility,' but wrote separately to express his belief that
the Eighth Amendment's heightened standard for reliability in the
context of capital sentencing also compelled reversal of the state
court's judgment.6' That standard "mandates recognition of a capital
defendant's right to require instructions on the meaning of the legal
terms used to describe the sentences.., a jury is required to consider
.... ,62 Thus, Justice Souter concluded that in any capital case in
which there is a reasonable likelihood that the sentencing terms will
not be clear to all jurors," the defendant may require the court to
instruct the jury on their meaning.' The court's failure to do so
would result in a sentence " 'freakishly imposed' " and require
57. Id. (plurality opinion) (citing Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 135 (1968)).
58. Id. at 2198 (plurality opinion).
59. Id. (Souter, J., concurring).
60. Id. (Souter, J., concurring).
61. Id. (Souter, J., concurring). The Eight Amendment provides: "Excessive bail shall
not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted."
U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
62. Id. (Souter, J., concurring).
63. Id. (Souter, J., concurring). There is substantial evidence that juror misunder-
standing in capital sentencing is widespread. See id. at 2191 (plurality opinion); William
Bowers, Capital Punishment and Contemporary Values: People's Misgivings and the
Court's Misperceptions, 27 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 157, 169-70 (1993); Theodore Eisenberg
& Martin T. Wells, Deadly Confusion: Juror Instructions in Capital Cases, 79 CORNELL
L. REV. 1, 4 (1993); Anthony Paduano & Clive A. Stafford Smith, Deathly Errors: Juror
Misperceptions Concerning Parole in the Imposition of the Death Penalty, 18 COLUM. HUM.
RTS. L. REv. 211, 222-25 (1987); cf J. Mark Lane, "Is There Life Without Parole?": A
Capital Defendant's Right to a Meaningful Alternative Sentence, 26 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 327,
335 (1993) (finding that 25% of Georgia juries that returned death sentences had inquired
as to whether the defendant could be released on parole if given a life sentence); William
W. Hood, IlI, Note, The Meaning of "Life" for Virginia Jurors and its Effect on Reliability
in Capital Sentencing, 75 VA. L. REV. 1605, 1624-25 (1989) (describing survey results that
indicate that while jurors would disregard a court's instruction not to consider parole, they
underestimate the amount of time that must be served on a life sentence before parole
becomes available). Acknowledging this, Justice Souter asserted that the judge must
always instruct the jury on parole when so requested by the defense. Simmons, 114 S. Ct.
at 2199 (Souter, J., concurring).
64. Simmons, 114 S. Ct. at 2198 (Souter, J., concurring).
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reversal on appeal.65 It would not suffice to allow the defendant to
inform the jury of parole ineligibility; upon a proper request by the
defense, the court itself must do so.66
Justice Ginsburg also wrote a concurring opinion. 7  She
expressed her view that due process would be satisfied if the
defendant were given the opportunity to inform the jury of his parole
ineligibility in response to a prosecutor's reliance on future dangerous-
ness.6 8  So long as "the relevant information is intelligently con-
veyed" to the jury, the court need not give the instruction itself.6 9
She further commented that she read the opinions of Justice
Blackmun and Justice O'Connor to reflect this view.7"
Justice O'Connor, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
Kennedy, concurred in the judgment.7' She agreed with Justice
Blackmun that barring a capital defendant from informing the jury of
his ineligibility for parole in order to counter a future dangerousness
argument offends due process.72 She also agreed that jurors cannot
reasonably be expected to understand the meaning of "life imprison-
ment" as that term is used by the states.73 However, Justice
O'Connor was careful to tie the judgment to the circumstances of this
particular case. If the State did not rely on future dangerousness in
its case for the death penalty, the State might properly decide that
parole is an inappropriate issue for the jury to consider.74 Where life
without parole is not the sole alternative to a death sentence, Justice
O'Connor felt that there are no due process implications for a future
dangerousness argument.75 Finally, she added that while a jury
instruction from the trial judge on Simmons's parole status would
have satisfied the Fourteenth Amendment, due process is achieved
65. Id. (Souter, J., concurring) (citing Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 310 (1972)
(Stewart, J., concurring)).
66. Id. at 2198-99 (Souter, ., concurring).
67. Id. at 2199 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
68. Id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
69. Id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
70. Id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
71. Id. at 2200 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judjment).
72. l (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
73. Id. at 2201 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
74. Id. at 2200 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment). This would be so, she
argues, "even if the only alternative sentence to death is life imprisonment without
possibility of parole." Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
75. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
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when the defense is permitted to bring parole ineligibility before the
jury.76
Justice Scalia dissented, joined by Justice Thomas. 77 He noted
that the "overwhelming majority" of states that allow juries to impose
or recommend death sentences withhold specific information about
parole from the jury.7" In addition, he cited California v. Ramos:79
" 'the wisdom of the decision to permit juror consideration of [post-
sentencing contingencies] is best left to the states.' "" While the
Court has held that a defendant's due process rights would be violated
if she were condemned to die on the basis of evidence that she was
not allowed to address, 81 Justice Scalia contended that the Simmons
case was not such a situation.' He argued that the State had in fact
not emphasized Simmons's future dangerousness,' and he expressed
76. Id. at 2200-01 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
77. Id. at 2201 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
78. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia conceded that "many" of those states
expressly listed "life without parole" as one of the sentencing options, necessarily putting
the defendant's parole ineligibility before the jury. Id. at 2201-02 (Scalia, J., dissenting);
see also id. at 2195 n.7, 2196 (plurality opinion) (noting that 17 of 26 states employing
juries in capital sentencing and providing for life without parole as a sentencing alternative
"expressly ... informj" the jury of parole ineligibility). Nevertheless, Justice Scalia
argued that some of these provide for capital sentencing alternatives without parole as
well; further, other states besides South Carolina keep parole information from the jury,
and still others "lack any clear practice." Id. at 2202 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
79. 463 U.S. 992 (1983).
80. Simmons, 114 S. Ct. at 2204 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Ramos, 463 U.S. at
1014).
81. Id. at 2202 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 5
n.1 (1986) (quoting Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 362 (1977))).
82. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
83. Id. at 2202-03 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia put in context the prosecutor's
statements cited by Justices Blackmun and O'Connor:
The defense in this case as to sentence ... [i]s a diversion. It's putting the
blame on society, on his father, on his grandmother, on whoever else he can,
spreading it out to avoid that personal responsibility. That he came from a
deprived background. That he didn't have all of the breaks in life and certainly
that helps shape someone. But we are not concerned about how he got shaped.
We are concerned about what to do with him now that he is in our midst.
Id. at 2203 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (internal quotations and citation omitted) (alteration in
original). Justice Scalia found the statement, in this context, "not even relevant to the
issue in this case." Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). The prosecution's other comment came in
the following context:
Your verdict shouldn't be returned in anger. Your verdict shouldn't be an
emotional catharsis. Your verdict shouldn't be... a response to that eight-year-
old kid [testifying in mitigation] and really shouldn't be a response to [Simmons's]
gruesome grotesque handiwork.... Your verdict should be a response of society
to someone who is a threat. Your verdict will be an act of self-defense.
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confidence that the jury's decision was based on the "sheer depravity
of th[e] crimes ... ."' In addition, if the defense were permitted to
introduce evidence related to parole, "many will think" that fairness
demands that the prosecution be able to use parole-based arguments
as well.' Moreover, Justice Scalia asserted that an inevitable result
of the Court's judgment would be exposure to a flood of appeals from
defendants whose parole, while not impossible, was unlikely or
nonthreatening, 6 leaving the Court with no logically compelling
basis for distinguishing Simmons from such situations.87
Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting) (internal quotations and citation omitted) (first alteration in
original). Justice Scalia read this reference to "self-defense" as alluding to Simmons's
existence, either inside or outside of prison, and thus not inviting the jury to believe that
Simmons would be eligible for parole. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). For a description of
prosecutors' use of fear-inspiring language in closing arguments of capital sentencing, see
generally WELSH S. WHITE, THE DEATH PENALTY IN THE EIGHTIES: AN EXAMINATION
OF THE MODERN SYSTEM OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 104-07 (1987).
84. Id. at 2202 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia added that the Court's hypothesis
that a jury informed of Simmons's parole-ineligibility might have given a life sentence
"achieves the ultimate in far-fetchedness when there is added the fact, according to
uncontroverted testimony of prison officials... [that] even current South Carolina law...
does not prohibit furloughs and work-release programs for life-without-parole inmates."
Id. at 2204 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). But see id. at 2195 n.6 (plurality
opinion) (noting that state regulations clearly prohibit work-release and most other
furloughs for parole-ineligible inmates).
85. Id. at 2205 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia further noted that "[m]any would
not favor the admission of such an argument-but would prefer it to a State scheme in
which defendants can call attention to the unavailability of parole, but prosecutors cannot
note its availability." Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). The implication appears to be that the
Court is not only inappropriately binding the hands of state legislators, but may in addition
defeat its purpose of protecting capital defendants by encouraging the states to do away
with the bar on parole-based arguments altogether. See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). It is
doubtless true that some capital defendants would prefer not to have their parole status
laid before the jury. However, a less drastic resolution to the problem is apparent: where
the defendant chooses to inform the jury of her parole status (and Simmons only addressed
the situation in which the prosecution relied upon a future dangerousness argument), the
prosecution may in turn present truthful information on the possibility of parole or other
forms of early release. Such a rule would leave to the defendant's judgment whether the
parole issue would in the end be of net benefit or harm, without leaving the prosecution
helpless to respond. Justices O'Connor and Kennedy and Chief Justice Rehnquist appear
to have had exactly this in mind. Id. at 2201 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment)
(stating that where the defendant informs the jury of his parole ineligibility, "the
prosecution is free to argue that the defendant would be dangerous in prison... [and also]
inform the jury of any truthful information regarding the availability of commutation,
pardon, and the like." (citation omitted)).
86. Justice Scalia envisioned appeals from capital defendants who were unlikely to be
paroled before reaching the age of seventy, or who argued that the recidivism rate of
elderly inmates released after many years in prison is negligible. Id. at 2204 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
87. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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For over two decades, the Supreme Court has emphasized that
execution is qualitatively different from other criminal penalties and
that the constitutional review of its imposition must be particularly
stringent.88 In 1972, the Court in Furman v. Georgia found virtually
all of the capital sentencing regimes then in use by the states unconsti-
tutional as violations of the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of "cruel
and unusual" punishment. 9 The controlling opinions' in Furman
condemned the unfettered discretion most states gave to the jurors or
judges who were charged with capital sentencing, finding that the
exercise of that discretion led to irrational and discriminatory
results." While the Court did not find the death penalty un-
88. See, e.g., Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 117-18 (1982) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) (noting that the qualitative difference between execution and imprisonment
requires "extraordinary measures" to "guarantee, as much as is humanly possible, that the
sentence [is] not imposed out of whim, passion, prejudice, or mistake"); Lockett v. Ohio,
438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (plurality opinion); Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 357 (1977)
(plurality opinion); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976) (opinion of
Stewart, J.).
89. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238,239-40 (1972) (joint opinion); see supra note 61.
90. All nine Justices filed opinions. Furman, 408 U.S. at 240. Justices Douglas,
Stewart, and White found that the sentencing procedures violated the Eighth Amendment,
but declined to find that under all circumstances the death penalty would offend the
Constitution. See iL at 256-57 (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 306 (Stewart, J.,
concurring); id. at 311 (White, J., concurring). Justices Brennan and Marshall believed
capital punishment to be unjustified and unconstitutional under any circumstances. See
id. at 305-06 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 358-59 (Marshall, J., concurring). Four
Justices dissented, see id. at 375 (Burger, C.J., dissenting),; id. at 414 (Powell, J.,
dissenting); id. at 465 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
91. Id. at 249-51, 255-56 (Douglas, J., concurring) (citing evidence of racial and
socioeconomic biases in the imposition of death sentences); id. at 310 (Stewart, J.,
concurring) (describing death sentences under the capital sentencing regimes as "wantonly
and ... freakishly imposed"); id. at 313 (White, J., concurring) (finding "no meaningful
basis" for distinguishing cases in which death was imposed from cases in which it was not);
cf. id. at 293 (Brennan, J., concurring) (finding the rarity with which the death sentence
was being imposed suggested an inference that it was being unfairly applied); id. at 364-66
(Marshall, J., concurring) (referring to evidence of racial, gender, and socioeconomic
discrimination). However, fifteen years later the Court refused to infer that racial
discrimination played a role in the imposition of a particular death sentence based on a
sophisticated statistical analysis which indicated, among other things, that homicide
defendants whose victims were white were more than four times as likely to be sentenced
to death as those whose victims were black. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 292-93
(1987) (stating that to succeed an individual defendant must prove that the sentence in his
particular case was the result of discriminatory intent). For discussion of the McCleskey
decision, see, e.g., Robert A. Burt, Disorder in the Court: The Death Penalty and the
Constitution, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1741, 1741 (1987) (describing McCleskey as the last nail in
the coffin for efforts to abolish the death penalty at the Supreme Court level); Randall L.
Kennedy, McCleskey v. Kemp: Race, Capital Punishment, and the Supreme Court, 101
HARv. L. REV. 1388, 1389 (1988) (describing the decision as "detestable" but not
"deviant").
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constitutional per se,9 it gave little guidance to the states as to what
form of capital sentencing might be acceptable.
In response to the Court's condemnation of unguided discretion,
most states redesigned their capital sentencing laws, following one of
two general models.93 Some adopted "guided discretion" models
which frame the sentencing decision in terms of relatively objective
criteria.9' In Gregg v. Georgia,95 the Court endorsed this general
approach as an adequate safeguard against the capricious results cited
in Furman.9
6
Other states made the death penalty mandatory for certain
crimes. 7 In Woodson v. North Carolina,98 decided the same day as
Gregg, the Court held that this approach violated the Eighth
Amendment.99 Writing for the Court, Justice Stewart stated that "in
capital cases the fundamental respect for humanity underlying the
Eighth Amendment ... requires consideration of the character and
record of the individual offender and the circumstances of the
particular offense as a constitutionally indispensible part of the
process. . . ."'I Therefore, in the Court's view, the Eighth
Amendment demanded that sentencing juries and judges consider the
particular circumstances that would distinguish those cases that called
92. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 306 (Stewart, J., concurring).
93. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 180 (1976).
94. See, e.g., id. at 160-68; see also Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 247 (1976)
(following Gregg); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 268 (1976) (same).
95. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
96. Id. at 192-95. The Georgia procedure approved by the Court provided for
separate guilt-determination and sentencing proceedings, id. at 160, consideration of
statutory and non-statutory aggravating and mitigating circumstances, id. at 164, and
expedited review of death sentences by the state supreme court (including a requirement
that the court demonstrate that the sentence is not dissimilar to prior decisions in favor
of death), id. at 166-67. But see Ursula Bentele, The Death Penalty in Georgia: Still
Arbitrary, 62 WASH. U. L.Q. 573, 579-80 (1985) (finding, in the wake of Gregg, no
meaningful way to distinguish Georgia capital cases in which the death penalty was
imposed from those in which it was not). See generally Steven M. Sprenger, Note, A
Critical Evaluation of State Supreme Court Proportionality Review in Death Penalty Cases,
73 IowA L. REv. 719, 722-26 (1988) (summarizing the Supreme Court's treatment of
proportionality review). As an obvious corollary to the Court's endorsement of guided
discretion, it held that the "punishment of death does not invariably violate the
Constitution." Gregg, 428 U.S. at 169.
97. See, e.g., Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 286-87 (1976); Roberts v.
Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 329 (1976).
98. 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
99. Id. at 301.
100. Id. at 304.
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for a death sentence from those that did not, while at the same time
avoiding the evils of arbitrariness decried in Furman.'0 '
The Court elaborated on the individualized consideration
requirement in Lockett v. Ohio."°  The defendant in Lockett had
been convicted of aggravated murder for her role as an accomplice in
a robbery-homicide. 3 Under Ohio law, an aggravated murder
conviction mandated a death sentence unless the judge found one of
three mitigating circumstances."° The sentencing judge found none
of those factors present in the defendant's case, and thus found no
alternative but to sentence her to death.0" The Supreme Court
overturned the sentence.' ° A plurality of the Court found that, in
all but the rarest of cases, the sentencer must not be precluded from
considering as mitigating factors the defendant's character, record, or
any other circumstance of the offense that the defense offers as the
basis for a lesser sentence than death.0 7 Thus, at some apparent
expense to the structured sentencing approach endorsed in Gregg, the
101. See Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738,748 (1990) (citing Eddings v. Oklahoma,
455 U.S. 104, 110-12 (1982); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 601-05 (1978)) (noting that the
consistency of sentencing and fairness to individual defendants have been the Court's
major concerns in the application of the death penalty). The compatibility of these
objectives has since been questioned by commentators and Justices alike. See Bowers,
supra note 63, at 160 (stating that the Gregg Court "changed its mind" about the
arbitrariness of capital punishment); infra notes 108, 150 and accompanying text. Others
have sought to reconcile the principles or establish some hierarchy among them. See Zant
v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862,879 (1983) (approving the Georgia capital sentencing procedure
because it provides for a narrowing of the class of death-eligible defendants at the
"definition" stage and for individual consideration at the "selection stage"); WHITE, supra
note 83, at 6-7 (contending that avoiding arbitrariness has been subordinated to
individualized consideration); Louis D. Bilionis, Moral Appropriateness, Capital
Punishment, and the Lockett Doctrine, 82 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 283, 298 (1991)
(stating that the requirement that the capital sentencer's discretion be controlled cannot
supersede the need for individualized consideration as a matter of constitutional law); Scott
W. Howe, Resolving the Conflict in the Capital Sentencing Cases: A Desert-Oriented
Theory of Regulation, 26 GA. L. REv. 323, 418-19 (1992) (stating that the Eighth
Amendment requires limiting the death penalty to those who deserve it).
102. 438 U.S. 586 (1978) (plurality opinion).
103. Id. at 589-93 (plurality opinion).
104. Id. at 593 (plurality opinion). The possible mitigating circumstances were: (1) that
the victim "induced or facilitated" the offense; (2) that the defendant acted under "duress,
coercion or strong provocation"; or (3) that the defendant suffered from "psychosis or
mental deficiency." Id. (plurality opinion).
105. Id. at 594 (plurality opinion).
106. Id. at 608-09 (plurality opinion).
107. Id. at 604 (plurality opinion). Lockett had argued that her character, age, lack of
a prior criminal record, lack of specific intent, and minor role in the crime should have
been considered as mitigating factors. Id. at 597 (plurality opinion).
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Lockett Court strengthened the ability of capital defendants to put
their cases before the finder of fact." 8
Eddings v. Oklahoma"°  solidified the individualized con-
sideration concerns of the Eighth Amendment a step further.
Eddings, a sixteen-year-old,"0 was tried as an adult and pled no
contest to the murder of a highway patrolman."1 The Oklahoma
sentencing statute permitted the defense to offer "any mitigating
circumstances, '  and the defense urged leniency on the basis of
evidence of Eddings's traumatic childhood, psychological problems,
youth, and potential for rehabilitation.' However, the judge
imposed the death penalty."4 While he gave "great weight" to the
defendant's youth, the judge suggested that under Oklahoma law he
could not consider Eddings's difficult background in mitigation. 5
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that while a sentencer may
determine the weight to be given to the evidence-possibly no weight
at all-it at least must consider the evidence." 6 The Eddings Court
found that under the Eighth Amendment, not only must the sentenc-
ing statute permit the defense to offer any aspect of the crime or
offender that might serve as the basis for a lesser sentence than
death," 7 but in addition "the sentencer [must] listen.""'
The Eighth Amendment has been the Court's primary tool in
regulating the death penalty; it is the basis of both the guided
108. See id. at 622 (White, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, concurring in the
judgment) (stating that the Court's rationale is inconsistent with Furman); id. at 631
(Rehnquist, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (arguing that the Court is
institutionalizing "freakishness" in the capital sentencing process); see also Callins v.
Collins, 114 S. Ct. 1127, 1127-28 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing that the twin goals
of limiting the sentencer's discretion and allowing capital defendants unlimited opportunity
to offer mitigating evidence are incompatible); id. at 1128-38 (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(same); Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 656-74 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment) (declaring intention not to follow the "Woodson-Lockett" line
of cases, because they are incompatible with Furman); infra note 150 (discussing the
Callins opinions of Justices Blackmun and Scalia).
109. 455 U.S. 104 (1982).
110. Id. at 105.
111. Id. at 106.
112. OKLA. STAT., tit. 21, § 701.10 (1980).
113. Id. at 107-08.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 108-09.
116. Id. at 114-15.
117. Id. at 110 (citing Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978)).
118. Id. at 115 n.10; cf. Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 393,397-99 (1987) (finding denial
of Eighth Amendment rights when the prosecutor and trial judge told a capital sentencing
jury they could consider only statutorily listed mitigating factors).
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discretion and the individualized consideration requirements.11 9
However, the Court has also expressed concern about a capital
defendant's right, under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, to present relevant evidence to meet evidence and
arguments used against him.12 A year after deciding Gregg and
Woodson, the Court considered the case of Gardner v. Florida.'
After the defendant in Gardner was convicted of murdering his wife,
the trial judge (with whom the sentencing authority rested) ordered
a presentence investigation." Relying in part on the resulting
report, the judge declined to follow the jury's recommendation of a
life sentence and condemned Gardner to death." A portion of the
report remained confidential, its contents unknown to parties or
counsel. 24 Justice Stevens, writing for the plurality, found that
Gardner's Fourteenth Amendment rights had been violated."z
Noting that capital sentencing must, of course, comply with the Due
Process Clause, he stated: "[Gardner] was denied due process of law
when the death sentence was imposed, at least in part, on the basis of
information which he had no opportunity to deny or explain.' ' 26
The Eighth Amendment concern for individualized consideration
and the due process requirement that defendants be permitted to
respond to arguments against them overlap to some extent. Their
congruence is demonstrated in Skipper v. South Carolina.27 Skipper
119. See Eddings, 455 U.S. at 110; Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (plurality
opinion); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239-40 (1972) (joint opinion); Howe, supra
note 101, at 323.
120. See Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 84,86-87 (1985) (finding denial of due process
when state fails to supply psychiatric assistance to a defendant who has made a preliminary
showing that his sanity at the time of the offense is likely to be a significant factor at trial);
Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 637-38 (1980) (holding that due process requires the
submission of lesser included offenses to the jury as alternatives to capital conviction or
acquittal); Green v. Georgia, 442 U.S. 95, 97 (1979) (per curiam) (finding exclusion of
potentially mitigating hearsay testimony violated due process); Howe, supra note 101, at
323 n.3.
121. 430 U.S. 349 (1977) (plurality opinion).
122. Id. at 352 (opinion of Stevens, J.).
123. Id. at 353 (opinion of Stevens, J.). The judge indicated that his decision was based
on evidence presented at both stages of the trial, the arguments of counsel, and his review
of the report. Id. (opinion of Stevens, J.).
124. Id. (opinion of Stevens, J.).
125. Id. at 362 (opinion of Stevens, J.).
126. Id. (opinion of Stevens, J.); cf Lankford v. Idaho, 500 U.S. 110, 126-27 (1991)
(finding a denial of due process where a capital defendant lacked sufficient notice that the
trial judge-might impose a death sentence).
127. 476 U.S. 1 (1986).
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was convicted of capital murder and rape."' At the sentencing
phase, the defense attempted to introduce witnesses' testimony that
the defendant had adjusted well to life in jail. 9 The trial judge
excluded the evidence as irrelevant, and the jury sentenced Skipper
to death. 3' The Justices unanimously concluded that the sentence
must be reversed, but they differed in their reasoning.13 1  The
majority relied upon Lockett and Eddings, finding that the defendant's
behavior in jail was an appropriate mitigating factor because it might
serve as " 'a basis for a sentence less than death.' ,,132 Justice
Powell, joined by Chief Justice Burger and then Justice Rehnquist,
declined to rely on the Eighth Amendment.1 33 He noted that
Eddings and Lockett mandated consideration of mitigating factors
relating to the particular offense or the defendant's character or
record, and contended that Skipper's attempted showing would not
fall into either category.13 ' However, because the prosecutor had
argued that Skipper was likely to commit violent crimes against other
prisoners, the excluded evidence would have undermined the State's
argument and the Due Process Clause demanded its admission. 35
At the same time, the Court has maintained that the factors a
capital sentencing jury may consider are generally to be decided by
128. Id. at 2.
129. Id. at 3. In its closing argument, the prosecution had emphasized that Skipper
would be a threat to those around him in prison if allowed to live. Id. at 9-10 (Powell, J.,
concurring in the judgment).
130. Id. (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment).
131. Id. at 4-5; id. at 9-10 (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment).
132. Id. at 4-5 (quoting Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (plurality opinion)).
But cf. Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164, 177-82 (1988) (plurality opinion) (finding that
a capital defendant's behavior during presentence incarceration need not be given weight
as a mitigating factor independent of its statutory role in a sentencing scheme previously
endorsed by the Court). In passing, the Skipper majority acknowledged that there had
also been a violation of Skipper's due process rights that would serve as an independent
basis for overturning the death sentence. Skipper, 476 U.S. at 5 n.1.
133. Skipper, 476 U.S. at 11 (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment).
134. Id. at 11-12 (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment). Justice Powell argued that
the Eighth Amendment bore on the right of the capital defendant to contest the "degree
to which [she] was morally responsible for her crime." Id. at 12 (Powell, J., concurring in
the judgment). He stated: "Society's interest in retribution can hardly be lessened by the
knowledge that a brutal murderer, for self-interested reasons, has been a model of
deportment in prison while awaiting trial or sentence." Id. at 14 (Powell, J., concurring
in the judgment). But cf id. at 7-8 (noting that the fact that a jury would naturally tend
to discount the defendant's own description of his deportment in jail as self-serving makes
the testimony of disinterested witnesses all the more crucial).
135. Id. at 9-11 (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment) (citing Gardner v. Florida, 430
U.S. 349, 362 (1977) (plurality opinion)).
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the states.'36 For example, in Jurek v. Texas, 37 a plurality of the
Court found that future dangerousness was an appropriate con-
sideration in capital sentencing, and it was not unconstitutionally
vague. 38  A related notion was expressed in California v.
Ramos,"9 in which the Court sustained the constitutionality of a
mandatory jury instruction that a sentence of life without parole might
be commuted by a governor to a sentence incorporating the possibility
of parole.'40 The Court found the instruction did not diminish the
reliability of the sentencing decision because the instruction was an
accurate statement that was relevant to future dangerousness, a
legitimate capital sentencing consideration. 4' The Court noted that
states legitimately might or might not adopt such a rule: "the wisdom
of the decision to permit juror consideration of possible commutation
is best left to the States.'' 142 Ramos has since been read to stand for
the proposition that instruction on any postsentencing contingency is
a matter for state law. 43
The Simmons plurality presented its decision as a logical
extension of the due process application of Gardner and Skipper.'"
The prosecutor had suggested that Simmons was potentially
dangerous and that therefore a death sentence was appropriate. 45
136. See Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597,2607-08 (1991); Blystone v. Pennsylvania,
494 U.S. 299, 309 (1990) (citing Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 306 (1972); Skipper, 476
U.S. at 11 (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment) (citing Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586,
604 n.12 (1978)).
137. 428 U.S. 262 (1976) (plurality opinion).
138. Id. at 274-75; see also Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939, 948-51 (1983) (plurality
opinion) (holding that the prosecution's presentation of aggravating factors is not limited
to statutory factors).
139. 463 U.S. 992 (1983).
140. Id. at 995, 1014. In so doing, the Court reversed the California Supreme Court's
determination that the instruction was unconstitutional because it focused the jury's
attention on a factor unrelated to its sentencing task, and that failing to inform the jury
that death sentences were also subject to commutation might mislead a jury into favoring
a death sentence in order to incapacitate the defendant. Id. at 996.
141. Id. at 1001-04. The Court further noted that the defendant was free to offer such
evidence or argument pertaining to commutation as he could muster. Id. at 1004.
142. Id. at 1013-14.
143. See Simmons, 114 S. Ct. at 2196 (plurality opinion); id. at 2200 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in the judgment); id. at 2204 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Ramos, 463 U.S. at
1014); Romano v. Oklahoma, 114 S. Ct. 2004,2009 (1994); Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct.
2597, 2608 (1991); State v. Simmons, 427 S.E.2d 175, 178 (S.C. 1993).
144. Simmons, 114 S. Ct. at 2192-93, 2194 (plurality opinion); see Skipper v. South
Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 5 n.1 (1986); id. at 10-11 (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment);
Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 362 (1977) (plurality opinion).
145. Simmons, 114 S. Ct. at 2190-91 (plurality opinion); see supra notes 22-25 and
accompanying text. But see Simmons, 114 S. Ct. at 2202-03 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Rather
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Although Simmons would be ineligible for parole, the defense was
forbidden to mention this fact, and also denied a jury instruction on
parole ineligibility.4 6 The Court found the sentencing violated the
Due Process Clause, for "[i]n assessing future dangerousness, the
actual duration of the defendant's prison sentence was undeniably
relevant."'47 Thus, as Justice Blackmun presented it, the violation
in Simmons is at least as egregious as when Skipper was prevented
from presenting evidence of a good adjustment to incarcerated
life."4 While Skipper may have been a model inmate,'49 Simmons
would not have been released on parole, at least under South
Carolina law as it then existed.5
On its surface, the Simmons decision appears to be more difficult
than Gardner and Skipper to reconcile with Ramos." As Justice
Blackmun recognized, "Ramos stands for the broad proposition that
we generally will defer to a state's determination as to what a jury
should and should not be told about sentencing."'5 Nevertheless,
for those states that are affected by the ruling,"' the Court appears
than emphasizing future dangerousness as a crucial factor, the prosecutor stressed the
nature of petitioner's crimes.").
146. Id. at 2190-92 (plurality opinion); id. at 2200 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the
judgment).
147. Id. at 2194 (plurality opinion).
148. See Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 3 (1986).
149. But cf. id. at 14-15 (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment) (suggesting that the
behavior of defendants awaiting trial or sentencing in jail has little probative value).
150.. Simmons, 114 S. Ct. at 2190 (opinion of Blackmun, J.). In his dissenting opinion
in Callins v. Collins, 114 S. Ct. 1127 (1994), written before Simmons, Justice Blackmun
expressed his belief that the twin constitutional requirements of reliable and individualized
sentencing can neither be sacrificed nor reconciled, and that therefore (so far as he could
foresee) no state capital sentencing scheme could be constitutionally legitimate. See
Callins, 114 S. Ct. at 1128-30 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). "From this day forward," he
declared, "I shall no longer tinker with the machinery of death." Id. at 1130 (Blackmun,
J., dissenting). In Callins, Justice Scalia agreed with Justice Blackmun that in Furman and
the Lockett-Eddings line of cases the Court had pursued incompatible capital sentencing
goals; however, his prescription was opposite Justice Blackmun's. Id. at 1127-28 (Scalia,
J., concurring). In Justice Scalia's opinion, it was not the punishment but the legal
doctrine, "invented without any benefit of textual or historical support," that must be
abandoned. Id. at 1128 (Scalia, J., concurring). For a criticism of Justice Scalia's
conclusion, see Bilionis, supra note 101, at 326-30.
151. See California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 1014 (1983); see also Skipper, 476 U.S. at
11 (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment) ("[T]he States ... retain 'the traditional
authority' to determine what particular evidence within the broad categories described in
Lockett and Eddings is relevant in the first instance." (quoting Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S.
586, 604 n.12 (1978) (plurality opinion)).
152. Simmons, 114 S. Ct. at 2196 (plurality opinion).
153. See supra note 46, infra notes 198-203 and accompanying text.
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to be requiring that the jury be allowed to consider" the defen-
dant's parole ineligibility when the prosecution suggests future
dangerousness.'55
However, the Ramos Court itself recognized that deference to
state decisions about substantive capital sentencing factors was
essentially a background upon which specific exceptions would be
placed.'56 When Ramos was decided in 1983, the Court had already
held that capital sentencing procedures may not be "excessively
vague,' 7 may not deny consideration of the individual characteris-
tics of the defendant or her crime' 5 8 and may not rely on the
contents of a partially undisclosed presentence report.5 9 Moreover,
since deciding Ramos, the Court has identified other restrictions."
Thus, the Court appears to view Ramos as an expression of federal
judicial restraint that must give way to the demands of the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments when necessary. These constitutional
demands, the Simmons Court decided, outweighed the state's interest
in cloaking the issue of parole.'
61
154. Justices O'Connor and Ginsburg made clear that they consider due process
satisfied when the defense is not forbidden to introduce evidence of parole ineligibility to
refute future dangerousness. See Simmons, 114 S. Ct. at 2199 (Ginsburg, J., concurring);
id. at 2200-01 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment); see also supra notes 66-76 and
accompanying text.
155. Simmons 114 S. Ct. at 2193 (plurality opinion); see id. at 2203 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
156. California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 1000 ("It would be erroneous to suggest...
that the Court has imposed no substantive limitations on the particular factors that a
capital sentencing jury may consider.. . ."); cf WHITE, supra note 83, at 77 ("Eddings and
Skipper show that the federal courts will have the final word in deciding what evidence is
relevant to the defendant's character or record or circumstances of the offense.").
157. Ramos, 463 U.S. at 1000 (citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 195 n.46 (1976)).
158. id at 1000-01 (citing Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976)).
159. Id. at 1001 (citing Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 351 (1977)).
160. See, e.g., Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 5 (1986) (holding that when the
prosecution argues future dangerousness as an aggravating factor, the defense may not be
prevented from introducing evidence of good conduct in jail).
161. See Simmons, 114 S. Ct. at 2196 (plurality opinion). According to some sources,
states initially adopted rules forbidding the mention of parole before a jury to protect
defendants from excessive prosecution. Paduano & Smith, supra note 62, at 219-20;
Hughes, Note, supra note 28, at 389-91. Forbidding the mentioning of parole would serve
to protect the defendant if the jury presumed that a defendant would serve the entirety
of the term nominally imposed. However, evidence suggests that most contemporary
capital sentencing jurors in fact suspect that defendants sentenced to life in prison will
eventually be released on parole. See supra note 63. Thus, the argument is made, the
prohibition on evidence of parole has been perverted from its original purpose when it
perpetuates a jury's belief that the defendant, if allowed to live, will spend less time in
prison than is actually likely to be the case. See Paduano & Smith, supra note 63, at 217-
20; cf. Hughes, Note, supra note 28, at 404-05 (suggesting that capital defendants be
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The Simmons Court invoked the Fourteenth Amendment's Due
Process Clause as the basis for its holding.62 Justice Blackmun (and
the Court) expressly reserved judgment on whether the Eighth
Amendment prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments was
offended.' 63 However, Justices Stevens and Souter were prepared
to acknowledge the force of the Eighth Amendment argument. 64
As discussed previously,"5 the Eighth Amendment concern for
reliable capital sentencing results and the due process requirement
that capital defendants be able to confront arguments used against
them with relevant evidence overlap to some degree. Given that
Skipper and Simmons, relying on the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments respectively, appear to make the same demand on the
state-that it not preclude the defense from presenting evidence of
the defendant's future harmlessness in response to the prosecution's
emphasis on his or her future dangerousness' 66 -it might appear
inconsequential which doctrine is ultimately applied.
If that were the case, however, the Simmons Court's reluctance
to invoke the Eighth Amendment seems puzzling. In a substantially
similar situation, 67 the six-Justice majority in Skipper found the
defense's offered showing of the defendant's good conduct in jail
mitigating evidence within the meaning of Lockett and Eddings161
Indeed, Justice Blackmun and Justice O'Connor were among the the
Skipper majority.'69 One possible explanation for the different
treatment is that the Skipper Court was unneccessarily extensive in its
allowed to choose whether the sentencing jury is given a "plain meaning" instruction or
is instructed on parole law).
162. Simmons, 114 S. Ct. at 2192-93 (plurality opinion); id. at 2198 (Souter, J.,
concurring); id. at 2199 (Ginsburg, J., concurring); id. at 2200-01 (O'Connor, J., concurring
in the judgment).
163. Id. at 2193 (plurality opinion). Interestingly, both Justice Blackmun and Justice
O'Connor joined the majority opinion in Skipper which, on a substantially similar question,
emphasized the Eighth Amendment concern for consideration of" 'any relevant mitigating
evidence.' " Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 4 (1986) (citing Eddings v. Oklahoma,
455 U.S. 104, 114 (1982)).
164. Simmons, 114 S. Ct. at 2198-99 (Souter, J., concurring).
165. See supra notes 127-35 and accompanying text.
166. See Simmons, 114 S. Ct. at 2198 (plurality opinion); Skipper, 476 U.S. at 4-5 (1986).
167. In Skipper, as in Simmons, the prosecution had emphasized that the defendant
would pose a threat if he were left alive, the defense had attempted to introduce evidence
relevant to the question of the defendant's future dangerousness, and the trial judge had
barred the defense's attempted showing. Simmons, 114 S. Ct. at 2090-92 (plurality
opinion); Skipper, 476 U.S. at 2-4.
168. Skipper, 476 U.S. at 4; see Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 110 (1982) (citing
Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (plurality opinion)).
169. Skipper, 476 U.S. at 2.
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reasoning; while either the Due Process Clause or the Eighth
Amendment might have furnished a basis for the judgment, 70 the
Court elected to use both.71  However, it was the Eighth
Amendment that clearly occupied the majority's attention in Skipper;
its treatment of due process was relegated to a footnote. 72  One
would expect a case purporting to follow Skipper to employ the same
approach.'73
Another possible explanation for Justice Blackmun's and Justice
O'Connor's reluctance to apply the Eighth Amendment in Simmons
might lie in the Court's perception of a qualitative difference between
presenting the jurors with evidence of the defendant's actual behavior
in the past 74 and inviting them to speculate about the future.75
However, the information excluded in Simmons would not lead to
jury speculation; to the contrary, the jury's knowledge that the
defendant would not be paroled would reduce speculation 176 and
appear to help assure the "reliability" demanded by the Eighth
Amendment. 7  Moreover, for the jury to guess at a defendant's
likely behavior in the future based on how he behaved before and
during the trial is hardly less speculative than guessing at the
likelihood of his eventual release based on the accurate belief that he
170. The Skipper majority considered the defendant's due process argument as well as
the Eighth Amendment, if only in passing. Id. at 5 n.1.
171. Id at 5 n.1, 8-9.
172. Id. at 5 n.1.
173. See Simmons, 114 S. Ct. at 2194 (plurality opinion).
174. The defendant's behavior in jail while awaiting trial and sentencing is an example
of relevant past behavior too which a witness may testify. See Skipper 476 U.S. at 3-5; id.
at 10 (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment).
175. The defendant's eligibility for parole might be one example of such future
conditions. See Simmons, 114 S. Ct. at 2190 (plurality opinion); cf. id. at 2204 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (" '[T]he wisdom of the decision to permit juror consideration of [postsente-
ncing contingencies] is best left to the States'" (quoting California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992,
1014 (1983))).
176. See id. at 2197 (plurality opinion). Of course, as South Carolina and its amici
argued, other sources of speculation might persist; the fact that a defendant is technically
parole-ineligible does not necessarily speak to whether she might escape, secure work-
release, threaten other inmates or correctional staff, or become eligible for release through
a change in the law. See id. at 2195 (plurality opinion). However, by accurately
instructing the jury with regard to one potential source of speculation, the overall level of
speculation involved might be reduced. Id. (plurality opinion).
177. See, e.g., id. at 2198 (Souter, J., concurring) (arguing that capital defendants should
be able to require the court to instruct jurors on the meaning of legal terms in order to
achieve a "reasoned moral choice between sentencing alternatives"); Lockett v. Ohio, 438
U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (plurality opinion) (holding that the "qualitative difference between
death and other penalties calls for a greater degree of reliability when the death sentence
is imposed").
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would be ineligible for parole.178 In any event, the Simmons Court
gave no such explanation for its reticence to consider the Eighth
Amendment. 79
It is more likely that two other factors explain the Simmons
Court's reluctance to invoke the Eighth Amendment. One is that the
Court evidently perceived differences in the ramifications of applying
the Due Process Clause or the Eighth Amendment. More specifically,
the Eighth Amendment appears to demand more of state sentencing
procedures than does due process.8 Logically, the interest in
heightened reliability' would be broader than the interest in
evidentiary fairness; the due process requirement that a defendant be
permitted to meet arguments with relevant evidence is only one of a
number of instruments to achieve reliability in death sentencing."
The language of the Simmons opinions bears this out. Justices Souter
and Stevens argued that the Eighth Amendment would place the
responsibility for a properly informed jury on the trial judge, at least
when requested by the defense, "whenever there is a reasonable
likelihood that a juror will misunderstand a sentencing term."'' The
other Justices in favor of reversal, citing due process, appear to be
satisfied so long as the defense can inform the jury of the defendant's
parole ineligibility"8 when the prosecution has affirmatively relied
178. Cf Skipper, 476 U.S. at 14-15 (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment) ("Good
behavior [of a capital defendant awaiting sentencing] would rarely be predictive as to the
conduct of the prisoner after sentence has been imposed.").
179. Simmons, 114 S. Ct. at 2193 n.4 (plurality opinion).
180. See ia& at 2198-99 (Souter, J., concurring); see also Skipper, 476 U.S. at 11 (Powell,
J., concurring in the judgment) (describing the Eighth Amendment as a broader basis of
decision than the Due Process Clause).
181. See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (plurality opinion).
182. See, e.g., Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 627 (1980) (holding that the death
penalty may not be imposed if the jury is not permitted to consider guilt of a lesser
included noncapital offense and if there was evidence to support such a verdict); Godfrey
v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 427-33 (1980) (reversing death sentence after Georgia Supreme
Court was found to have neglected its oversight function of ensuring proportionality);
Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (plurality opinion) (requiring that capital
sentencer not be precluded from considering the defendant's character and record or the
circumstances of the crime if offered as mitigating factors).
183. Simmons, 114 S. Ct. at 2198 (Souter, J., concurring) (emphasis added). Given the
evidence of popular beliefs about the actual periods of incarceration resulting from life
sentences, such a rule would make parole instruction for capital sentencing juries
functionally mandatory. See id. at 2199 (Souter, J., concurring); see also supra note 63.
184. Justice Blackmun' opened with the assertion that "due process requires that the
sentencing jury be informed that the defendant is parole ineligible," Simmons, 114 S. Ct.
at 2190 (plurality opinion) (emphasis added), and later criticized the state for "concealing"
Simmons's parole ineligibility and "preventing the jury from learning" of it, id. at 2193,
2198 (plurality opinion). Justice Ginsburg clarified that her concurrence was premised on
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on future dangerousness in advocating a death sentence.18s
Therefore, although due process and the Eighth Amendment might
compel the same result in Simmons,'86 due process only allows a
jury instruction on parole ineligibility when the prosecution argues
future dangerousness of the defendant, whereas the Eighth
Amendment holding would require such an instruction whenever the
jury is likely to be confused about the defendant's parole status.187
The second factor relates to the application of the Eighth
Amendment to death penalty cases. The Lockett Court was con-
cerned with allowing the capital defendant to present mitigating
evidence based on the "defendant's character or record and any of the
circumstances of the offense ... ."" The Eddings decision rooted
itself in Lockett 89 but added broader language, holding that the
"State may not ... preclude the sentencer from considering any
mitigating factor, [nor] may the sentencer refuse to consider.., any
relevant mitigating evidence."'' " The Skipper majority concluded
that although Skipper's future dangerousness did not directly relate
to his culpability for his crime, the evidence of his past behavior in jail
while awaiting trial was nevertheless valid mitigating evidence within
the meaning of Lockett and Eddings.19' However, three Justices
found that the Eighth Amendment did not require states to permit
the understanding that presentation of parole ineligibility by the defense would satisfy due
process. Id. at 2199 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). But cf. id. at 2203 (Scalia, J., dissenting)
("Justice Blackmun appears to... requir[e] the admission of parole-ineligibility even when
the prosecutor does not argue future dangerousness.") (citing id. at 2194 (plurality
opinion)).
185. Id. at 2190 (plurality opinion); id. at 2199 (Ginsburg, J., concurring); id. at 2200-01
(O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment). Justice Blackmun and Justice O'Connor do
not, of course, find that an instruction from the trial judge would be inappropriate; rather,
they regard it as merely nonessential. See id. at 2190, 2193 (plurality opinion); id. at 2200-
01 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
186. See id. at 2198 (Souter, J., concurring).
187. See id at 2190; id. at 2198 (Souter, J., concurring); cf. supra note 63 and
accompanying text. Indeed, if parole status is a mitigating factor under the Eighth
Amendment, then it should be admissible regardless of whether the prosecutor makes a
future dangerousness argument. See Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1986);
Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 110 (1982) (plurality opinion). But cf. Romano v.
Oklahoma, 114 S. Ct. 2004, 2011 (1994) ("The Eighth Amendment does not establish a
federal code of evidence to supercede state evidentiary rules in capital sentencing
proceedings.").
188. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (plurality opinion).
189. Eddings, 455 U.S. at 110 (plurality opinion) (citing Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604
(plurality opinion)).
190. Id. at 113-14 (plurality opinion) (emphasis added).
191. Skipper, 476 U.S. at 4-5.
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capital defendants to present mitigating evidence unless it "excuse[d]
the defendant's crime [or] reduce[d] his responsibility for its commis-
sion."'" In Simmons, the evidence that the defendant sought to
introduce was even further removed from the individual factors
surrounding his crime and character; whereas Skipper sought to
introduce evidence of his own past conduct,193 Simmons sought to
bring a matter of state law to the jury's attention.194 Therefore,
insofar as some Justices on the Simmons Court were reluctant to
adopt the Skipper majority's relatively broad interpretation of
"mitigating evidence," due process represented the easiest resolution
of the case.'95
Because a majority of the Court was unwilling to join Justice
Souter's application of the Eighth Amendment,'96 the Simmons
decision may signal a desire to curb the implications of Skipper.
While not retreating from that decision-Simmons and Skipper are
hardly incompatible' 9 -- the Court has signalled that the place of the
Eighth Amendment in future dangerousness issues is in doubt.
The implications of the Simmons decision are clearest for those
states that, like South Carolina, refuse to instruct capital sentencing
juries on parole eligibility,9 ' or that lack any clear practice.' 9 By
allowing capital defendants to inform the jury of their parole
ineligibility when the prosecution relies on a future dangerousness
argument,2 "0 the Simmons Court is demanding a change in state law.
Less directly affected are those states that specifically identify one of
the sentencing alternatives as life without parole and those that allow
the jury itself to specify whether a capital defendant shall be parole-
eligible.2 'z In such states the matter is expressly placed in the jury's
hands. Nevertheless, those states should not ignore Simmons. By
drawing a constitutional line,"° the Simmons Court binds the future
192. Id. at 12 (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment); see Howe, supra note 101, at 393
n.277.
193. Skipper, 476 U.S. at 3.
194. Simmons, 114 S. Ct. at 2191 (plurality opinion).
195. See id. at 2199 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). For an attempt to organize the Court's
Eighth Amendment capital punishment jurisprudence in a retributive rather than utilitarian
context, see Howe, supra note 101, at 417-19.
196. Simmons, 114 S. Ct. at 2198-99 (Souter, J., concurring).
197. See id. at 2194 (plurality opinion).
198. See id. at 2196 n.8 (plurality opinion).
199. See id. at 2196 n.7 (plurality opinion).
200. Id. at 2190 (plurality opinion).
201. See id. at 2195 n.7 (plurality opinion).
202. See id. at 2193 (plurality opinion).
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legislative policy of all states. Additionally, as Justice Scalia noted,
some states that give the jury a choice between death and life without
parole also provide for sentencing options that may include parole,
without giving the jury specific instructions on parole itself.2 3
The logic behind Simmons seems to reach beyond the narrow
situation in which a capital defendant, ineligible for parole in the
event of a life sentence, is confronted with the argument that he will
pose a threat in the future unless executed.2" As Justice Scalia
asked, if the impossibility of parole is a compelling factor in capital
sentencing, should not the great unlikelihood of parole be nearly as
compelling? 5 He stated:
I see no more reason why the United States Constitution
should compel the admission of evidence showing that,
under the State's current law, the defendant would be
nonparolable, than that it should compel the admission of
evidence showing that parolable life-sentence murderers are
in fact almost never paroled, or are paroled only after age 70
206
Consequently, looming on the horizon is a potential storm of appeals
from capital defendants with all manner of permutations of parole
statuses. Presumably, the Court will have to decide at what point the
relevance of the capital defendant's parole status is too speculative to
be critical in refuting an argument of future dangerousness. Justices
Stevens and Souter, as discussed above,207 appear ready to require
court instruction in any capital case in which parole status in the event
of a sentence other than death is not clear to the jury.20 8 The other
Justices in favor of reversal offered little indication as to where that
203. Id. at 2201-02 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
204. See iL at 2190-91 (plurality opinion); id. at 2201 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the
judgment).
205. See id. at 2204 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
206. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia noted that the Court had, at the time the
opinion was written, already received a petition for review that claimed a defendant was
entitled to have the jury instructed that, although he would be parolable after 20 years, the
recidivism rate for former inmates released so long after admission is insignificant. Id.
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Petition for Cert. in Rudd v. Texas, O.T. 1993, No. 93-7955).
The Court denied certiorari to Rudd after deciding Simmons. See Rudd v. Texas, 114 S.
Ct. 2783, 2783 (1994). Justice Blackmun dissented, stating that the death penalty cannot
be fairly imposed under the Constitution and referring to his dissent in Callins v. Collins,
114 S. Ct. 1127, 1128-38 (1992) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). See supra note 150.
207. See supra note 183 and accompanying text.
208. See Simmons, 114 S. Ct. at 2198 (Souter, J., concurring).
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line might lie, having carefully worded their opinions to apply to
relatively few situations.2"
One petition for certiorari that the Court has granted, vacating
the judgment and remanding the case for reconsideration in light of
Simmons, may provide some insight about the Court's future
direction. In State v. Price,21 the defendant complained on appeal
of being denied the opportunity to make parole-related arguments to
the sentencing jury.21' The defense was barred at trial from men-
tioning parole.2 2 In addition, Price was prevented from informing
the jury that the trial judge could require that a life sentence, if
recommended, would have to be served at the completion of a life
sentence that he was currently serving in Virginia. 213  Thus, it
appears that Price was not strictly parole-ineligible, but merely
unlikely to be released on parole.214 This suggests that the Court
perceives a role for evidence of parole ineligibility beyond the narrow
circumstances of Simmons or at least sees the issue as litigable.215
The due process analysis in Simmons was straightforward and
represented the simplest resolution of the case.216 The fact that
Simmons was prevented from meeting the prosecution's future
dangerousness argument with evidence of his ineligibility for parole
clearly defied Gardner's due process requirement that a capital
defendant have the opportunity to "deny or explain" any information
used to support a death sentence.2 7 Moreover, the excluded
information was "indisputably relevant" to the question of whether
Simmons would pose a threat in the future.21  That relevance was
209. See icL at 2190 (opinion of Blackmun, J.); id. at 2199 (Ginsburg, J., concurring); id.
at 2201 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
210. 388 S.E.2d 84 (N.C.), vacated, Price v. North Carolina, 498 U.S. 802 (1990),
reinstated, State v. Price, 418 S.E.2d 169 (N.C. 1992), vacated, Price v. North Carolina, 113
S. Ct. 955, reinstated, State v. Price, 433 S.E.2d 746 (N.C. 1993), vacated Price v. North
Carolina, 114 S. Ct. 2777, reinstated, State v. Price, 448 S.E.2d 827 (1994).
211. Id. at 99.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Two other appeals similarly remanded involved circumstances substantially similar
to those of Simmons. See Ramdass v. Commonwealth, 437 S.E.2d 566, 573 (Va. 1993),
vacated, Ramdass v. Virginia, 114 S. Ct. 2701 (1994); Wright v. Commonwealth, 427 S.E.2d
379, 392-93 (Va. 1993), vacated, Wright v. Virginia, 114 S. Ct. 2701 (1994).
216. See Simmons, 114 S. Ct. at 2192-96 (plurality opinion).
217. Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 362 (1977) (plurality opinion).
218. Simmons, 114 S. Ct. at 2194 (plurality opinion).
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evidenced when the jury specifically asked the trial judge whether a
life sentence would include the possibility of parole.21 9
A strong Eighth Amendment argument existed, however.220 In
light of the Skipper decision, it is difficult to perceive how the Eighth
Amendment might tolerate prohibiting a capital defendant from
presenting relevant evidence to meet a future dangerousness
argument' While Lockett and, by its facts if not its language,
Eddingst the cases principally relied upon by the Skipper majority,
did not apply the Eighth Amendment to the presentation of evidence
outside of the context of the defendant's character, record, and the
circumstances of the crime,' Skipper clearly would have brought
evidence relating to the defendant's future dangerousness within the
Amendment's ambit. 4
Applying the Eighth Amendment would enable the Court to
avoid the problem pending as a result of Simmons.m The Simmons
decision dealt with the injustice of depriving capital defendants of the
opportunity to confront future dangerousness arguments used against
them. However, while limiting its holding to the narrow circumstan-
ces of that case, the Simmons Court failed to provide a logical basis
for so limiting itself. 6 Potentially, the Court faces a tide of appeals
from defendants with only slight variations in parole status. However,
the Court lacks any firm basis for distinguishing among these
variations.'n
If and when the Court faces that tide of appeals, it may be
tempted to follow Justices Souter and Stevens in applying the Eighth
219. See id. at 2192 (plurality opinion).
220. See id. at 2198-99 (Souter, J., concurring); Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1,
4-5 (1986); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 110-12 (1982); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S.
586, 604 (1978) (opinion of Burger, C.J.).
221. See Skipper, 476 U.S. at 4-5.
222. See supra notes 109-18 and accompanying text.
223. Skipper, 476 U.S. at 11-12 (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment).
224. Id. at 4-5.
225. See Simmons, 114 S. Ct. at 2203-04 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
226. See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
227. See supra notes 204-08 and accompanying text. Due process analysis might be
limited to those cases in which the prosecution relied on future dangerousness, since the
relevant Fourteenth Amendment concern is that a capital defendant be given the
opportunity to respond to arguments with relevant evidence, see Gardner v. Florida, 430
U.S. 349, 362 (1977) (plurality opinion); but this would permit the jury to implicitly
consider future dangerousness with the omnipresent if unspoken confusion about the
defendant's parole status, see Skipper, 476 U.S. at 5; Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 276
(1976) (opinion of Stevens, J.); supra note 63.
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Amendment.' Rather than leave the presentation of evidence of
parole to the interested interpretations of the parties,22 9 and depen-
dent on such arbitrary issues as strict parole ineligibility"0 or
whether the prosecution argues future dangerousness, 21 the Court
may impose a "straightforward duty" on the trial court to instruct the
jury, in the interest of "heightened reliability," on a capital defen-
dant's parole eligibility.1 2 Such a holding would be consistent with
the Court's post-Furman interest in the reliability of capital sentencing
procedures.2 3  It would put accurate information before the jury
from the most authoritative and unbiased source available, 4 and
the only death sentences avoided would be those that the jury, had it
known the defendant's parole status, would not have imposed in the
first instance. 5
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228. See Simmons, 114 S. Ct. at 2198-99 (Souter, J., concurring).
229. See id. at 2198 (plurality opinion); id. at 2199 (Ginsburg, J., concurring); id. at
2200-01 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
230. See id at 2198 (plurality opinion); id. at 2199 (Ginsburg, J., concurring); id. at 2201
(O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
231. See id. at 2198 (plurality opinion); id. at 2201 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the
judgment).
232. Id. at 2198-99 (Souter, J., concurring).
233. See, e.g., Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738, 748 (1990); Lockett v. Ohio, 438
U.S. 586, 604-05 (1978) (plurality opinion); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188 (1976)
(opinion of Stewart, J.).
234. See Simmons, 114 S. Ct. at 2198-99 (Souter, J., concurring) (citing Boyde v.
California, 494 U.S. 370, 384 (1990)).
235. Cf id. at 2194-95 n.5 (plurality opinion) (noting that under Simmons the State is
free to argue that a parole-ineligible inmate is still a threat); id. at 2201 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (same).
